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Through the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), the National Shipbuilding 
Research Program (NSRP) completed a study in 1992 where the NSRP identified the top-
level parameters that have an effect on the cost of naval shipbuilding. These parameters, 
identified in the study “Evaluating the Producibility of Ship Design Alternatives,” are 
arrangements, simplicity, material, standardization and fabrication requirements.  
Since 2011, the Budget Control Act has created a climate wherein cost reductions 
dominate the program manager’s decision-making process. Consequently, it is important 
for submarine program managers to understand the limitations of submarine cost 
construction estimates. In “Density as a Cost Driver in Naval Submarine Design and 
Procurement,” a 2008 Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Benjamin P. Grant suggests the 
potential of applying a modular outfitting density factor into the submarine cost 
estimating process. 
This thesis investigates the arrangement aspect of the NSRP study using outfitting 
density, how tightly the submarine’s components are installed within a determined 
volume, and the correlation on production man-hours used to construct the submarine. 
The results of this study evaluate outfitting density and construction costs of historical 
submarines and find a positive correlation to aid cost estimators in determining if an 
outfitting density-adjusted cost estimating relationship (CER) is applicable for preparing 
submarine construction cost estimates.   
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Through the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), the National Shipbuilding 
Research Program (NSRP) completed a study in 1992 where the NSRP identified the top-
level parameters that have an effect on the cost of naval shipbuilding. Those parameters 
were (1) arrangements; (2) simplicity; (3) material; (4) standardization and (5) fabrication 
requirements. Since 2011, the Budget Control Act has created a climate wherein cost 
reductions dominate the program manager’s decision-making. Consequently, it is 
important for submarine program managers to understand the limitations of submarine 
cost construction estimates. A thesis by Benjamin P. Grant in June 2008, “Density as a 
Cost Driver in Naval Submarine Design and Procurement,” suggests the potential of 
applying a modular outfitting density factor in the submarine cost estimating process. 
This thesis investigates the arrangement aspect of the NSRP study investigating outfitting 
density, how tightly the submarine’s items are installed within a determined volume, and 
the possible correlation on production man-hours used to construct the submarine. The 
results of this study will evaluate outfitting density of historical submarines to aid Naval 
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 05C cost estimators in determining if an outfitting 
density adjusted cost estimating relationship (CER) is applicable for preparing the costing 
position for the Ohio Replacement and Virginia class Payload Module Programs. 
 The NAVSEA 05C construction cost estimates use the estimated weight report for 
the submarine as the backbone of the estimate. CERs are applied to the estimate to 
convert the weight into material and labor dollars. The weight report and the cost 
estimate follow a very similar methodology in their development as the program 
progresses through the acquisition process ranging from high risk analogous estimates to 
low risk refined engineering estimates and extrapolated actuals. 
 The methodology began with the final weight estimate (FWR) of past submarine 
classes and extracting the outfitting weight and locations. These weights were 
manipulated and organized into the forward operating (OPS) compartment and aft 
machinery compartment. The useable volumes for the compartments per class of 
submarine were calculated from the Booklets of General Plans. This data was used to 
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develop the outfitting density for the OPS and machinery compartments for each 
submarine. NAVSEA 05C provided end cost and production man-hour (mhrs) return data 
for each submarine from the Information Management System (IMS) database. 
Production mhrs were divided by light ship weight (in long tons (LT)) then subtracted 
from the mean production mhrs/LT for the submarine fleet in Figure 1. In Figure 1, each 
colored shape represents each submarine class categorized by shipbuilder. The orange 
squares represent the Ohio class submarines (OH). The gray triangles represent the 
Seawolf class submarines (SW). Los Angeles class submarines are represented by blue 
shapes with shipbuilder A represented with diamonds (LA/SY A), and shipbuilder B 
represented with stars (LA/SY B). The Virginia class submarines are represented by 
yellow ‘X’ for shipbuilder A (VA/SY A) and green circles for shipbuilder B (VA/SY B). 
The vast majority of the submarine fleet is within 500 mhrs/LT of the mean. The outliers 
tended to be the first and second of the class. This plot shows the learning curve of each 
shipyard that built the different submarines. 
Figure 1. Scatter plot of the difference of production mhrs per LT per 
submarine above and below the mean production mhrs per LT for all 
submarines in data set. 
The production mhrs were then plotted against the outfitting density for the OPS, 
Figure 2, and machinery compartments, Figure 3. While no obvious correlation can be 
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drawn throughout the submarine fleet relating outfitting density to production mhrs, there 
does appear to be a positive correlation between outfitting density and production mhrs 
within each submarine class.   
 
Figure 2. Outfitting density verses production mhrs of the OPS 
compartment per submarine class by flight 
 
Figure 3. Outfitting density versus production mhrs of the machinery 
compartment per submarine class by flight  
 
Since the construction method and processes used for the Virginia class will be 
leveraged for the Ohio Replacement class, the learning curve for the shipyards contracted 
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to build the submarines should be minimal and be achieved faster than for the prior 
classes. For the Ohio Replacement program, the expected production mhrs/LT will be 
within 500 mhrs/LT of the fleet mean production mhrs/LT after the learning curve if the 
class production follows Figure 1. In Figure 2, the Ohio Replacement predicted OPS 
compartment outfitting density is approximately half way between the Ohio class and the 
Los Angeles and the Virginia classes. This means the production mhrs for the Ohio 
Replacement OPS compartment should be between what was reported for the Ohio class 
and the Virginia class. In Figure 3, one can see that the Ohio Replacement predicted 
machinery compartment outfitting density is greater than the machinery compartment 
outfitting densities for the Los Angeles, Ohio, and Virginia classes but less than the 
Seawolf class. The prediction is that the production mhrs for the Ohio Replacement will 
be more than the reported production mhrs for the Los Angeles, Ohio, and Virginia 
classes but less than for the Seawolf class.   
This analysis attempted to investigate the relationship between outfitting density 
and construction cost through the use of production mhrs. The assumption was that as 
more components are installed into a limited volume that it would potentially take more 
production mhrs to complete. The result was a positive correlation between the outfitting 
density and production mhrs of the OPS and machinery compartments. More data is 
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A. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY 
The National Shipbuilding Research Program (NSRP) completed a study in 1992 
wherein the NSRP identified the top level parameters that have an effect on the cost of 
shipbuilding. These parameters are arrangements, simplicity, material, standardization 
and fabrication requirements (Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division 1992, 
7B2-1). This research dives into the arrangement aspect evaluating outfitting density, 
how tightly the submarine’s items are installed within a determined volume, and the 
possible correlation on the production hours to construct the submarine.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The 2011 Budget Control Act creates a climate where cost reductions dominate 
the program manager’s decision-making process. Consequently, it is important for 
submarine program managers to understand the limitations of submarine construction 
cost estimates. Though there are numerous avenues one can explore, a thesis by 
Benjamin P. Grant in a June 2008, “Density as a Cost Driver in Naval Submarine Design 
and Procurement,” suggests the potential of applying a modular outfitting density factor 
in the submarine cost estimating process. Modular outfitting density is defined as the 
degree of compactness of a particular modular area. Using this factor will facilitate 
understanding the difference between new construction submarines and past classes to 
identify potential areas of potential growth/reduction. This research examines modular 
outfitting density relative to the Ohio Replacement Class Submarine Program and how 
the modular outfitting density affects the construction cost of submarines.  
C. IMPLICATIONS  
The results of this study will evaluate outfitting density of historical submarines to 
aid Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) 05C cost estimators in determining 
whether or not a density-based cost-estimating relationship (CER) should be developed to 
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account for any construction cost implications due to the outfitting density of certain 




The focus on this study is the United States (U.S.) Navy Submarine Force. 
NAVSEA 05C cost estimators are preparing the costing position for the Ohio 
Replacement and Virginia class Payload Module Programs. This study will aid in the 
submarine baseline cost development and determine whether or not a density-adjusted 
CER is appropriate. To understand the potential effect outfit density may have on 
submarine production and the limitations to this study, one needs to understand how 
submarines are designed and constructed and how the weight and costing estimates are 
developed. 
1. SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION 
Today, submarines are constructed in the U.S. by two major shipyards, General 
Dynamics Electric Boat (EB) and Huntington Ingalls Newport News Shipbuilding 
(NNS). EB is located in Groton, Connecticut with a modular construction, manufacturing 
and outfitting facility in Quonset Point, Rhode Island. NNS is located in Newport News, 
Virginia. In terms of infrastructure, both shipyards have full capability to produce 
submarines, and through different types of purchasing agreements and contracts, have 
historically been involved in building most classes of U.S. Navy submarines. 
a. Historical Modular Shipbuilding 
Between 1941 and 1945, Henry Kaiser implemented the Kaiser Shipbuilding 
Techniques, which revolutionized the U.S. shipbuilding industry. His modular 
construction philosophy enabled 18 shipyards to produce 2,751 Liberty ships in support 
of World War II (Hepinstall 2014). According to Hepinstall (2014, 5), “modular 
construction is a process where individual modules or volumes are constructed off-site, 
typically under controlled plant conditions, stand alone, are transported to the site and 
then assembled together onsite to make up a larger structure.” Kaiser’s modular 
philosophy developed what is known today as the “1-3-8” rule. This means that every 
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hour that is used to accomplish a task in a shop environment will lead to a corresponding 
three hours in a temporary environment and an additional eight hours in the final stages 
of the construction effort (Seubert 1988). In shipbuilding, this means every hour of 
production in the shop environment will follow with three hours in assembly and eight 
hours inside the hull. Previously, submarines were assembled piece by piece on location, 
typically on the shipbuilding ways or inclined railway. The submarine hull was 
constructed, and then large holes were cut out of the top to allow equipment to enter the 
vessel and be installed. There were numerous issues that drove up the man-hours (mhrs) 
for producing the ship: crowded environment with limited space for mobility, 
compartments easily filled with smoke, paint and other fumes, everything was on an 
angle (parallel to the incline of the ways or rail system), poor lighting, and shops, tools, 
and supplies are not co-located. With emphasis on the 1–3-8 rule, technology and 
production development, and the need for a safer working environment for production 
personnel, submarine modular construction evolved. 
b. Submarine Modular Construction 
Modular shipbuilding methods for submarines were implemented beginning with 
the Ohio class submarines in the early 1970s (Williams 2005). The development of the 
modular construction technology throughout the Ohio class production line enabled the 
builder to reduce production labor hours from the lead ship significantly. During this time 
period, the Los Angeles class was also in production using the more traditional method of 
joining empty cylinders then loading individual pieces through the topside hatches 
(Holmander and Plante 2011). Modular construction technology continued to develop 
through the Seawolf and Virginia classes enabling advances toward outfitting the 
modules, thus reducing production hours needed for assembly as demonstrated in Figure 
1.  The higher the percentage complete of the module prior to hull assembly, the more the 
production yards can take advantage of the aforementioned 1–3-8 rule. Outfitting is 
defined as the action of installing various ship systems and equipment that allow the ship 
to operate and perform various missions. The scope of outfitting includes structural, 
piping, electrical power distribution, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), 
joiner and insulation (Hepinstall 2014). Today, the modules being produced for the 
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Virginia class have approximately 95 percent of the outfitting completed prior to their 
assembly (Williams 2005).  
 
Figure 1.  Outfitting completed at pressure hull closure by submarine class at 
Electric Boat (EB) (from Williams 2005) 
The ability to install equipment and advance outfitting during construction is 
greatly improved using a process known as end loading. A “raft” is an open unit with as 
much of the outfitting as possible installed that slides into the module, shown in Figure 2.  
This process takes advantage of the shipbuilder’s 1–3-8 rule with the goal of reducing the 
resultant production mhrs, and it also enables outfitting to take advantage of space that 
was inaccessible when working inside the module (Holmander and Plante 2011). A 
drawback of the end loading method is that the submarines are designed with an extra 
foot of beam. The extra volume is to accommodate the flexible mounting and to slide the 
raft into the hull cylinder; however, that extra space is not usable for outfitting 
components or for any other function that could take advantage of the extra volume. 
Though this is desirable for the construction process, it is undesirable for the submarine 
community in terms of procurement costs. The Navy is purchasing a larger submarine 
with volume that is unusable to the submariners.      
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.  
Figure 2.  A “raft” being loaded onto USS New Hampshire (SSN 778) at EB’s 
Quonset Point facility (from Holmander and Plante 2011) 
2. Design Philosophy 
With each class of submarine design, the design philosophy evolves. The geo-
political environment and current economic pressures influence the focus of the classes’ 
design philosophy.      
a. Historical 
History is a very important factor in submarine design. Shortly after the Cold War 
began, with adversarial submarines gaining capability, U.S. submarine designers focused 
on the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission, emphasizing quieting technology and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability (Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center 2014). The submarine classes of the 1960s included the George Washington 
ballistic missile submarines and the Permit class fast attack submarines. As the ballistic 
missile capability became a key leg in the country’s nuclear triad, emphasis was also 
focused toward increasing subsurface launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technology.  
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In the 1970s, ASW, ISR, and SLBM capability were still a top priority. The Los 
Angeles fast attack submarine class was designed to be able to escort and track with an 
aircraft carrier battle group, thus speed was also an important characteristic (Naval 
Undersea Warfare Center 2014). Ohio class ballistic missile submarines began 
production increasing the SLBM quantity carried on the submarine. Not only was the 
Ohio class an invaluable leg of the nuclear triad, but they were also the largest 
submarines the U.S. Navy had designed and built to date. During this time, EB began 
revamping their submarine production facilities and methodologies to incorporate a more 
modular methodology to aid in the Ohio class construction (Williams 2005).  
 In response to the U.S. threat, Russia expanded its operating areas into the Arctic 
Ocean and produced two new classes of threatening submarines: the SSBN Typhoon and 
SSN Akula classes. In the 1980s, the Los Angeles class design was modernized with 
technological improvements in combat systems, vertical launch technology for 
Tomahawk missiles and ice-breaking capability. Designs for the new Seawolf class were 
developed and contracted for 29 submarines (Naval Undersea Warfare Center 2014). The 
Seawolf class had that era’s ultimate capability for ASW, ISR and polar missions, and 
was fast, acoustically superior and could navigate in deeper waters than any other fast 
attack submarine. All this capability came at a price, however, and with the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the close of the Cold War (Naval Undersea Warfare Center 2014), 
resources to support the submarine community became scarce. This change in global 
landscape placed less of a priority on the ASW mission, and resulted in the cancellation 
of the Seawolf class after only three submarines were built.  
Nonetheless, the submarine community soon came to realize that a new fast attack 
class was needed to replace the Los Angeles class. With the rising threat of terrorism, the 
fast attack strike mission took precedence (Naval Undersea Warfare Center 2014), and by 
the late 1990s, the Virginia class submarines were designed and contracted to address the 
emerging needs. The Virginia class, as well as four converted Ohio class guidance 
missile submarines (SSGN), addressed the new emphasis on ISR, special operations 
forces (SOF) mobility and irregular warfare, and strike mission capability. With the anti-
access/area-denial (A2/AD) environment of the Chinese and Russians developing and 
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producing increased capability in their submarines, the ASW mission emphasis re-
emerged with a large technological effort being placed on acoustic superiority within the 
budgeted cost constraints in place from the Budget Control Act of 2011.  
b. Design/Build to Design/Build/Sustain 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a paradigm shift occurred within the submarine 
design community. With the cancellation of the tumultuous Seawolf class production, 
there was tremendous pressures to reduce costs for the Virginia class and to ensure the 
community did not repeat the issues that brought the Seawolf class to a close. The goal 
was to reduce production labor by 40 percent from the USS Seawolf (Williams 2005), so 
the submarine community shifted the design focus to take the construction process into 
account. The design community harnessed the knowledge of the current workforce that 
had experience from the Los Angeles, Ohio, and Seawolf classes. As design efforts 
focused on designing for production, many sustainment issues needed to be addressed, 
such as the following:  
While outfitting modules are heavily pursued as a cost-cutting measure in 
new construction, they can have a tendency to cause accessibility issues 
for maintenance. …outfitting modules should be vetted through Design-
for-Maintenance lens during the design process to ensure total ownership 
cost goals are achieved. (Hepinstall 2014, 10)  
The Design/Build/Sustain philosophy alters the design focus to be on production 
as well as on sustainability. The use of rafts in submarine construction means that the 
equipment on the raft can be installed in many locations that production personnel were 
formerly unable to access using more traditional means of construction. The 
sustainability issue is that once the raft is slid into place and the pressure hull welded 
together, some of the equipment that was installed on the raft becomes inaccessible. 
Sustainability mhrs increased as a result of having to remove interferences, work the 
item, and then reinstall the interferences. This created unintended rework, and thus 
increased sustainability costs. Accounting for the sustainability factor in the design, 
mitigates these types of issues. 
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3. Submarine Volumetrics 
For a submarine to be able to submerge, the density of the entire envelope of the 
submarine must be equal to the density of the water in which it intends to submerge. This 
constrains the characteristics of the submarine. While computing the ideal size of the 
submarine, thorough analysis is performed in determining the diameter of the hull and the 
optimal length-to-diameter ratios for hydrodynamic characteristics. On a ballistic missile 
submarine the missile tubes may be the determining factor for the diameter of the hull. 
Other diameter drivers are the propulsion plant, weapons storage, and internal volume 
requirements for tanks and other system elements. Limitations for diameter include draft 
restrictions for dry docks and ports, and any displacement limitations that may have been 
imposed on the design. For all submarines, if the diameter is too large, the deck heights 
will be too high making efficient utilization of the space difficult. If the diameter is too 
small, the deck height will be too short, resulting in insufficient headroom for the crew 
(Jackson 1992, 419). There are numerous studies that have analyzed the optimal diameter 
as a function of deck spacing. One of those states that 
the optimum has not been reached by any major submarine since the 
HOLLAND type at the beginning of this century. As more and more 
equipment is required in present submarines, it is unlikely that this 
optimum will ever be obtained due to the limitations on draft in most of 
the harbors of the world. (Jackson 1992, 419) 
Modern-day modular construction methods have added to this complexity. Additional 
space must be built into the diameter to accommodate flexible mounting and other 
support structure for housing the raft units. Unfortunately, this additional space is 
unusable for outfitting systems. Once the diameter is set, the length is determined. There 
are optimal length-to-beam ratios that can be used to initially determine the length of the 
submarine.  
Once these characteristics are set, there are two limitations that typically occur as 
the program progresses through the design process. If the available volume of the 
submarine is arranged to its extent and the submarine has not reached the displacement 
needed to submerge, then the design is considered “volume limited.” To reach the 
necessary displacement, lead ballast is added into the design to consume the difference. 
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On the other hand, if the weight reaches the displacement needed to submerge prior to 
arranging all the necessary systems on board, and then the design is considered “weight 
limited” and weight saving measures are required. Options would be to add length to the 
parallel mid-body, or to evaluate ways to reduce weight. While the length and diameter 
could feasibly change if a program warranted lengthening the boat, this type of change is 
very costly and has many political implications. The vast majority of past submarine 
designs have been volume limited rather than weight limited.  
4. Weight Estimating 
Estimating the weight of a submarine is a complex iterative process that occurs 
through each phase of the acquisition process. Some factors that make submarine weight 
estimating unique are that submarine volumetrics and Archimedes principles must be 
considered in parallel with the weight estimating. “The fundamental goal in submarine 
design: during its entire life, the submarine shall be capable of achieving neutral 
buoyancy and zero trim for all design conditions” (Society of Allied Weight Engineers, 
Inc. 2007).  
In concept development, preliminary light ship weight estimates are formulated 
from curves, formulas, or experience. The analysis of alternatives (AoA) designs are 
analyzed using analogous and parametric estimates. The chosen concept’s weight 
estimate will serve as the baseline for the preliminary design phase. Any major 
requirement or characteristic changes will update the baseline to a new baseline. This 
initial baseline will serve as the Milestone A position. 
During preliminary design, the design is refined. Since submarine designs are 
typically evolutionary based on past submarine designs, the weight is derived from 
refined analogous estimates based on historical data and parametric estimates. Some of 
the weight data may be calculated based on some completed modeling, completed system 
descriptions, or arrangement approvals. Before entering detail design, an Accepted 
Weight Report (AWE) will be accepted by NAVSEA. The AWE is the best 
representation of the submarine’s weight and hydrostatic characteristics at Milestone B.  
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In detailed design and construction phases, the weight estimates for the submarine 
are more defined as the program progresses through detail design. As models are 
completed and drawings approved, the weight estimate should incorporate more details 
and evolve to a majority of calculated weights. Then during the construction process, the 
actual weights for key items may be included in the weight estimate based on 
procurements. Post construction, the construction yard will complete an inclining 
experiment—a stability test that will validate the condition A weight and centers of the 
submarine, and a trim dive—a neutral buoyancy test that validates the weight and 
locations of the permanent ballast (Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Inc. 2007). From 
these tests, the Final Weight Report (FWR) for the delivered vessel is generated. The 
unwritten goal is for the delivered submarine to be within one half of a percent of the 
expected weight.    
a. Weight Classification Systems 
Weight information for a particular hull will be classified by an organizational 
structure. “The weight classification system provides guidance and definition at the 
system and subsystem level and aids in preparation of a complete and accurate estimate” 
(Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Inc. 2007, 63). Modern hulls use the Expanded Ship 
Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS). Prior classes have used the Ship Work Breakdown 
Structure (SWBS) and Bureau of Ship Consolidated Index (BSCI). Since prior submarine 
weight breakdowns were classified under different systems, extra care must be taken 
when comparing historical data. Manipulation of the data may be necessary to account 
for the differences among the various breakdown structures to ensure an appropriate 
comparison. Table 1 displays the first level of the ESWBS breakdown. Group 100 
accounts for all the structural elements, hull structure, decks, bulkheads and equipment 
foundations. Group 200 encompasses the propulsion plant, both nuclear and non-nuclear 
components, from the reactor to the propeller or propulsor. All the power generation 
components and cabling are contained within group 300. Group 400 represents all the 
combat systems, communications, and navigation systems. Group 500 includes the 
auxiliary systems such as steering, anchor handling, and HVAC. Outfitting and 
furnishings, such as offices, medical, stores, berthing, joiner work and paint are allocated 
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to group 600. Group 700 is armament, including guns, torpedo launchers, strategic 
weapon systems components, torpedo equipment and depth charges. Variable loads are 
included in group 800. These variable loads encompass liquid volumes in tanks, 
expendables, food, and consumable stores. This breakdown also serves as the backbone 
of the construction cost baseline.  
Table 1.   ESWBS description (after Society of Allied Weight Engineers, Inc. 
2007) 
Group # ESWBS Name Description, examples 
100 Hull Structure Shell plating, decks, bulkheads, framing, 
superstructure, pressure hull, foundations 
200 Propulsion Plant Reactor, turbines, gears, shafting, 
propeller/propulsor, steam piping, shielding 
300 Electric Plant Ship service power generation, cabling, 
lighting, emergency electrical 
400 Command and 
Surveillance 
Navigation, communication, fire control, 
radars, sonars, radios, C2 systems 
500 Auxiliary Systems HVAC, anchor handling, fire control, 
steering 
600 Outfit and Furnishings Hull fittings, paint, insulation, berthing, 
offices, storerooms, medical 
700 Armament Guns, missile launchers, ammo, torpedo 
equipment, depth charges,  
800 Variable Loads Tank liquid loads, expendables, consumables 
 
b. Displacement 
Displacement is defined as the weight of the volume of water that is displaced by 
the submarine. Since the submarine operates both on the surface as well as sub-surface, 
there are multiple displacements for each submarine that correlate with that submarine’s 
conditions. The displacement of a submarine that is submerged and is operating at some 
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depth is referred to as the Condition N Submerged displacement. The loading conditions 
of the variable loads for the submarine in Condition N are defined in Naval Ships 
Technical Manual (NSTM) Chapter 096 and serve as the “typical” submarine load out for 
a typical mission over a typical length of time. To submerge the submarine from a 
surfaced condition, the boat opens its MBT vents and floods the MBTs with the 
surrounding water. The difference in displacement of a submerged submarine and a 
surfaced submarine, in Condition N, is equal to the amount of main ballast tank (MBT) 
water. The surfaced condition is referred to as Condition N Surfaced. The Condition A 
displacement, also known as the Light Ship (LS) weight, is determined by removing the 
variable loads and variable ballast water from the Condition N Surfaced displacement. 
The Dry Weight of the submarine includes all the Group 100 – 700 weights. Adding the 
nuclear and non-nuclear operating liquids to their respective systems, increases the 
displacement of the submarine to her Condition A-1 displacement. Permanent lead ballast 
lines the interior of the MBTs and other key locations within the pressure hull. This lead 
enables the submarine to submerge with the given MBT volume, and also enables the 
submarine to have growth margin for future modernizations. The amount of this lead 
defines the difference between the submarine’s Condition A-1 and Condition A 
displacements. Condition A displacement is also referred to as the submarine’s light ship 
weight. Figure 3 summarizes the difference among the submarine displacement 
classifications.   
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Figure 3.  Submarine displacements (after Society of Allied Weight Engineers, 
Inc. 2007) 
c. Key Deliverables 
The weights of the design are tracked via a quarterly weight report throughout the 
preliminary design, detail design and construction phases. The Accepted Weight Estimate 
(AWE) is the weight report that is the best representation of the submarine at Milestone B 
and relays details of the design at the three-digit ESWBS level, along with the 
corresponding loading condition, and hydrostatic characteristics. This AWE contractually 
obligates weight growth margin, the ability to grow in weight, to the different 
stakeholders: NAVSEA, Naval Reactors, and design yard and build yard. There is a 
percentage of the A-1 Weight that is required by the ship specifications to be available 
when the ship delivers. This is for future growth and is allocated for the service-life of the 
submarine. The AWE serves as the baseline weight for the Milestone B costing position 
for projected construction costs.  
The Final Weight Report (FWR) reflects the final status of the delivered ship 
design and construction effort. The weights used in this analysis are derived from the 
FWRs.  
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At the AWE, a large percentage of the weight is estimated though analogous 
methods or projected nominal weights from suppliers. Many of the component and tank 
volume estimates have many assumptions, and are dependent on communications among 
the government, design yard and suppliers. There is high risk that the light ship weight 
will grow through the detailed design process, especially as arrangements are approved 
and drawings begin to be developed. The weights that are calculated from the 3-D 
product model are dependent on the modelers’ assumptions and the consistency of 
modeling practices between them. From a weight perspective, this risk is mitigated 
through the use of weight growth margin. However, since this weight estimate is used for 
the construction cost estimate, this growth risk is not directly accounted for in the cost 
estimating process.  
B. COST ESTIMATING 
1. Acquisition Cycle 
Growth in U.S. Navy shipbuilding costs have historically exceeded the rate of 
inflation. The Navy’s budget for procurement is unable to support the continued growth 
in ship acquisition costs. Recent regulation, like the Budget Control Act of 2011, has put 
an additional strain on the Navy’s budget. “The economy-driven factors (material, labor 
and equipment) account for roughly half the overall rate of increase, whereas the 
customer-driven factors (complexity, standards and requirements and production rate) 
account for the other half” (Arena et al. 2006). There is tremendous pressure on the 
shipbuilding community to reduce the cost of submarines and to demonstrate that cost 
targets developed by Congress can be achieved.   
The cost estimating process is very similar to the weight estimating process as a 
program progresses through the acquisition cycle. Many of the estimation methods are 
similar in philosophy. Early in the concept refinement phase, cost estimates are analogous 
ratios based on the concept being considered and how similar or dissimilar they are to 
historical data. Historical cost data needs to be normalized for content, historical prices, 
and inflation escalation. As a concept is selected and refined, parametric estimates for the 
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Milestone A cost position can be developed based on mathematical relationships between 
cost, and various independent variables. Cost estimating relationships (CER) are 
developed to estimate the cost of new systems where analogous relationships are not 
applicable. Throughout preliminary (Technology Development phase) and detail design 
(System Development and Demonstration phase), the cost estimating is refined iteratively 
using an engineering build-up technique to develop parts of the construction costs. As 
bills of material are produced, using shipyard standards, the cost estimators can refine 
their estimates appropriately. Then, as actual purchasing agreements are made with 
suppliers, actual costs can be incorporated into the estimate. The NAVSEA 05C Cost 
Estimating Handbook examines each of the cost estimating methods throughout the 
acquisition process. Figure 4 is a summary of the cost estimating methods used 
throughout the acquisition process.   
 
Figure 4.  Common estimating methods by life cycle phase 
(from Deegan 2004) 
2. Construction Cost Estimating 
Basic Construction Costs (BCC) are reported in the Procurement Budget Exhibit 
5 (P-5). There are seven main categories of the P-5: basic construction, construction 
plans, change orders, government furnished materials (GFM), ordnance, escalation and 
other costs (Deegan 2004). The BCC is the shipbuilder’s portion of the ship’s end cost. 
This includes shipbuilder direct labor, indirect labor, material costs and profit associated 
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with building a ship. There are multiple methods that the cost estimators use to develop 
the BCC estimates (Deegan 2004).     
a. Weight Based Cost Estimating 
For many current estimating methods, weight is used as the key parameter to 
determine costs. “Weight is the most consistent physical property that the designer is able 
to provide to the ship cost estimator. Therefore, the most common parametric form 
employed in ship cost estimating uses weight as the technical parameter” (Deegan 2004). 
The cost estimator will use the estimating methods described above with the predictive 
weight information for the vessel to be construction to develop the CERs and the BCC.  
b. Other Cost-estimating Methods 
Other estimating methods include Product-Orientated Design and Construction 
(PODAC) cost modeling and the bottom’s-up method. The PODAC cost model is 
product-based and process-driven, as opposed to system-based and weight-driven. It is 
sensitive to shipyard processes and techniques. For example, the PODAC cost model 
develops the labor CER as a function of shipyard processes versus an hour per ton 
relationship based on reported cost data and ship weight reports. The bottom’s-up method 
requires a granular fidelity in the ship design to be able to estimate accurately. This 
method identifies each item, material and labor, in the schedule, and builds the estimate 
up. Due to the complexity of the design, this process is very elaborate. 
c. Limitations 
The cost estimating team has to make many assumptions to develop the cost 
estimate. These assumptions may not hold true throughout the development process. For 
example, data that is based on historical data is at the mercy of the fidelity of the reported 
data. Also, cost estimates that are based on weight estimates carry a large uncertainly due 
to having two factors of estimation in the process (both cost and weight). Political 
pressures may also add biases into the estimating process, putting pressure on the 
program to limit the size of the ship in efforts to control the cost but could compromise 
mission. The 1992 RAND study concluded that 
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the most extreme result of assuming that cost is a direct function of weight 
has been the imposition of displacement limitations on some ship types 
during the design process in the misguided expectation that such a 
limitation would control costs. (Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock 
Division 1992, 7B2-1) 
C. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
1. Key Findings from Prior Thesis Research 
Research in evaluating ship construction costs to understand the cost drivers has 
been studied in the past and continues to be studied. Three theses conducted at Naval 
Postgraduate School and Massachusetts Institute of Technology have evaluated the cost 
drivers from different perspectives. 
a. NPS Thesis by LT Benjamin Grant 
In 2008, Lieutenant (LT) Benjamin Grant wrote a thesis for the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), “Density as a Cost Driver in Naval Submarine Design and 
Procurement.” The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between 
submarine density and costs and to determine if a relationship exists and what could be 
learned for the design and procurement of U.S. Submarines. Grant’s key findings were 
(1) cost and performance risk are asymmetric, meaning that programmatic risk associated 
with underestimating the volume required for the submarine is greater than the 
programmatic risk associated with producing a submarine that is unnecessarily large; (2) 
weight reduction efforts increase costs; (3) density and cost exhibit a family of “U”-
shaped curves; and (4) density management alone will not reduce costs.  
This thesis will examine Grant’s preliminary work and refine it to investigate the 
relationship between outfitting density by compartment and production costs.  
b. MIT Thesis by LT Ungtae Lee 
In 2014, LT Ungtae Lee explored and improved the current weight based 
parametric method in early cost estimation using mainly outfitting density and power 
density in the naval surface fleet. The key findings of LT Lee’s study were that he 
developed a CER using electrical power density and light ship weight, and demonstrated 
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the relationship between outfitting density and electrical power density versus cost per 
ton for naval surface vessels. 
c. MIT Thesis by LT Aaron Dobson 
In 2014, LT Aaron Dobson quantified, assessed, and analyzed cost versus 
subsystem complexity in an effort to refine the current cost estimating relationships used 
in U.S. Navy shipbuilding. The result of his study was that acquisition contract cost per 
unit was highly correlated with unit complexity.  
D. SUMMARY 
With this past research as a starting point, the thesis research herein attempts to 
examine past submarine classes to determine if a correlation exists between the outfitting 
density of similar compartments and costs.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. GENERAL APPROACH 
1. Submarines Selected 
Initially the submarines selected for this study dated back as far as the weight data 
is available. The intent was to see if correlations could be drawn between many 
submarine classes. Depending on the submarine class, the shipbuilders ranged from EB 
and NNS to Mare Island Shipyard, Portsmouth Shipyard and Charleston Naval Shipyard 
(Federation of American Scientists 2015). The mathematical model that quantifies the 
efficiencies gains from repeatable actions, known as the learning curve, has an important 
role in shipbuilding. Each shipbuilder has its own learning curve. Since EB and NNS are 
the only shipbuilders that currently build U.S. Navy submarines, the submarine classes 
used in the analysis were built by either EB or NNS in order to accommodate each 
shipyard’s learning curve.  
SUBSAFE is a quality assurance program that provides maximum reasonable 
assurance that submarine hulls will have watertight integrity and recoverability from 
unanticipated flooding. Though this program is vital to the submarine community, the 
requirements imposed on design practices, personnel training, material quality, 
manufacturing processes, and certification are very costly in both material, labor and 
overhead dollars. The Los Angeles class was the first class of U.S. Navy submarine to be 
entirely designed and built to SUBSAFE requirements, from concept design through the 
life cycle.  
With SUBSAFE requirements and shipyard learning curves taken into account, 
this analysis will focus on the following submarine classes: Los Angeles, Ohio, Seawolf 
and Virginia. The difference between the pre-Los Angeles class submarines and post-Los 
Angeles class submarines are very significant in that the data became too skewed to 
develop any correlations.  
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a. Data 
Condition A, light ship weight, displacement data was compiled using the vessels’ 
applicable FWR data. This weight includes Group 100 through Group 700 weight data 
plus the amount of solid ballast. It is appropriate to use the Condition A displacement 
data since this is representative of the hull and all the components that are installed to 
create the submarine. The weights for each submarine were divided into the appropriate 
ESWBS group at the one digit level (e.g., 100, 200... 700). The 200–700 weight groups 
were added together to represent the outfitting weight when calculating the outfitting 
density. The 100 weight group identifies the structural components and is not considered 
outfitting.  
End cost and man-hour data were retrieved from the NAVSEA 05C Information 
Management System (IMS) database. The end cost data for each submarine was escalated 
to fiscal year (FY) 2015 constant year (CY) dollars and sorted by delivery shipyard. 
Production mhrs for each submarine was also sorted by delivery shipyard. In 
conversations with NAVSEA 05C, if outfit density was to be investigated, one would 
expect the shipyard’s production mhrs would increase or decrease based on how tightly 
the components had to be installed into a limited area. The production mhrs do not 
encompass engineering and overhead mhrs that are also essential in producing a 
submarine.  
Volume data was obtained using the Booklet of General Plans for the applicable 
submarine. For this study, molded volume was used except for the Virginia Class 
submarines. The molded volume represents the volume inside the submarine with the 
inner face of the shell plating as the vessel’s interior boundary. Classes prior to Virginia 
loaded compartments right up to the shell framing. Due to the modular construction end 
loading technique used on Virginia class, extra volume is necessary to support the mounts 
for the rafted units that slide in. For the Virginia class, the molded volume was reduced to 
represent the usable volume of the submarine.  
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b. Manipulations 
The data had to be manipulated to create a consistent analysis. Each class of 
submarine was an evolutionary design, both in terms of design and organizational 
structure.   
The ESWBS categorization did not exist on all past classes of submarines. The 
older classes, such as Los Angeles and Ohio classes, used BSCI. The group weight data 
had to be evaluated and sorted in order to ensure that weights for the different groups 
where represented similar data. In addition, over time, there have been some impactful 
technological improvements external to the pressure hull that needed to be accounted for 
in the group weight data. Examples include propeller and propulsors, as well as the hull 
treatments.  
The volume breakdown of the analysis needed to be aligned among submarines. 
The forward operating compartment (OPS), and aft machinery space was proportionally 
evaluated. For the fast attack (SSN) submarines, the division between the OPS and 
Machinery compartments was taken at the normal fuel oil (NFO) tank bulkhead, shown 
in 0 For the Ohio class, shown in Figure 6, the missile compartment (MC) is between the 
OPS and machinery compartments. The outfitting weight data for each submarine was 








Figure 6.  SSBN compartment division (not to scale) (after Daley et al. 2014) 
For the submarines in this analysis, the build yard was either NNS or EB. 
Production data was segregated by each shipyard. By separating the production data for 
each shipyard, the learning curve aspect of the data is kept separate since each shipyard 
learns at an individual rate. Starting with Virginia class, a unique partnership was made 
between the two shipyards and enforced by congress with the FY96 National Defense 
Authorization Act (Schank et al. 2011). For this, data for the Virginia class production 
data has been segregated by final assembly yard.  
Lastly, to respect the sensitivity of the production data, all the charts where 
normalized to mask the sensitive data. NAVSEA 05C is the point of contact if this data 
needs to be obtained.  
c. Limitations 
There are many assumptions made for the data used. The data pulled from the 
IMS was reported by the shipyard and entered into the database. The assumption is that 
the data was reported correctly and that the person entering that data into the database did 
so correctly. Another assumption is that the process for recording and reporting the data 
has been consistent over the past 50 years.  
 
B. DENSITY DEVELOPMENT 
Outfitting density was plotted against production mhrs to determine if a 
correlation exists. Sets of plots were segregated by compartment across the variety of 
submarine classes to understand if a correlation exists between the type of compartment 
and the time is takes for the shipyard to produce it. The group 200–700 weight data was 
interrogated to the three digit ESWBS level and segregated by longitudinal location of 
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the items on the boat. This developed a weight per compartment result, which then was 
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Wcompartment = weight in long tons (LT) of the compartment 
Vcompartment = volume of the compartment in cubic feet (CF) 
With the outfitting densities by compartment being determined, the mean outfitting 
density of each compartment was calculated: OPS outfitting density mean and machinery 
outfitting density mean. The MC was not evaluated since there was not enough history 
(one class of submarine) with which to draw a correlation. 
Table 2 shows the resulting outfitting density of the individual compartments for 
each of the submarine classes and is discussed in section III.C.1. The numbers shown in 
the table are the difference between the class mean and the overall compartment mean. A 
negative number means that the outfitting density of the compartment for that class is the 
less than the overall mean for that compartment, or that the components in the 
compartment are not as tightly installed as in the average compartment. A positive 
number means that the outfitting density of the compartment for that class is more than 
the overall mean for that compartment, or that the components in the compartment are 
installed tighter together that the average compartment. 
Table 2.   Outfitting density (lbs/CF) by submarine class and compartment 


























OPS -3.05 -3.34 2.70 3.01 3.34 -0.22 -5.36 3.18 -0.19 
Machi
nery 
-7.82 -8.49 -3.32 -2.76 -2.19 6.43 16.08 -4.39 0.433 
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For the analysis, plots and resulting regressions were developed for outfitting 
density versus productions mhrs. 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Production Man-hours Analysis  
A plot was generated to determine the production mhrs needed to produce each 
submarine by shipyard. The mean production mhrs for the fleet was calculated, and then 
the difference between each reported submarine total and the mean was plotted in Figure 
7. In Figure 7, colored shapes represent each submarine class categorized by shipbuilder. 
The orange squares represent the Ohio class submarines (OH). The gray triangles 
represent the Seawolf class submarines (SW). Los Angeles class submarines are 
represented by blue shapes with shipbuilder A represented with diamonds (LA/SY A), 
and shipbuilder B represented with stars (LA/SY B). The Virginia class submarines are 
represented by yellow ‘X’ for shipbuilder A (VA/SY A) and green circles for shipbuilder 
B (VA/SY B). The vast majority of the reported mhrs were within 500 production mhrs 
of the mean. The few outliers can be attributed to the learning curve. Seawolf spent well 
above the average production hours in construction for her lead ship and second of class. 
Virginia’s first and second of class for each shipyard are also high above the mean 
production mhrs and is on a steady decline toward the mean. Lastly, the first Los Angeles 
class built at Shipyard A was more than 500 mhrs above the mean production mhrs. 
These outliers are all first and second of class submarines and thus can be attributed to 
the learning curve for each shipyard on each submarine class. The Ohio class mhrs were 
below the mean of the data set. The slope of the resulting data set was asymptotic to 
approximately the -500 production mhrs/LT difference from the mean line, representing 
the shipbuilder maximum learning for the process used to produce the Ohio class 
submarines.   
There is a limitation with the Virginia class production mhrs/LT data. The 
Virginia class contract is shared between NNS and EB. Each shipyard builds a portion of 
the submarine. Each shipyard then assembles one submarine each, delivering a total of 
two submarines to the fleet per year. The learning curve for each of the submarines has a 
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mix between each shipyard’s production of the set portions and the experience of the 
assembly for the total submarine. The delta seen in Figure 7 for the Virginia class data 
sets highlights the difference in the learning for the assembly of the submarine.   
 
Figure 7.  Scatter Plot of the difference of production mhrs per LT per 
submarine above and below the mean production mhrs per LT for all 
submarines in data set. 
2. Outfitting Density 
The resulting outfitting density (difference from the compartment mean) for 
submarine classes by flight and compartment are shown in Table 2. The Ohio class OPS 
compartment outfitting density was significantly less than for the other classes in the 
study. The Ohio class compartments have more volume available for component 
installation due to the larger beam. The Seawolf long hull was also significantly less than 
the mean due to the added length of the hull. This is due to the addition of parallel 
midbody that was added to the production of this vessel. The Los Angeles improved class 
has the greatest density in the OPS compartment, followed closely by the Virginia class. 
Both Los Angeles and Virginia have the smallest useable diameters of the submarine 
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fleet. For the machinery compartment, Seawolf was the densest and Ohio was the least 
dense. The Seawolf’s machinery compartment 200, 300, and 500 group weights were 
higher than the other fast attack submarines. Currently, the prediction for Ohio 
Replacement are 0.19 less than the mean of OPS outfitting density and 0.433 greater than 
the mean for the machinery compartment density. 
3. Correlations 
To investigate correlations between the production mhrs and the outfitting 
density, the data sets were analyzed based on compartments. 
The OPS compartment mean outfitting density was plotted against mean 
production mhrs for the specific class for the OPS compartment in Figure 8. Each flight 
of each class from each shipyard was grouped close to each other, except for Seawolf. 
There is no correlation across the submarine classes. Los Angeles and Virginia class have 
similar outfitting density for the OPS compartment; however, Virginia class mean 
production mhrs are significantly higher, on the order of 50 percent more mhrs. This 
potentially represents the learning curve needed for the fly-by-wire and other non-
propulsion combat system improvements that are unique to the Virginia platform. The 
outfitting density increases on the Los Angeles class as the capability increases. As a 
result, the production mhrs did increase slightly. A similar trend can be seen between the 
Ohio submarine designed for the Trident missiles and the Ohio submarines designed for 
Trident II missiles. There is not enough end data reported for Virginia class to witness 
any correlation within the class. Figure 9 develops some trend lines within the Los 
Angeles and Ohio classes. On Los Angeles class, for every unit increase in density in the 
OPS compartment, approximately 222,382 additional mhrs will be needed with a linear 
reliability of 0.65. For the Ohio class, for every unit increase in density in the OPS 
compartment, 403,703 additional mhrs will be needed with a linear reliability of 1.0. 
There are only two data points for the Ohio class, so the linear reliability value is 1.0.   
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Figure 8.  Outfitting density verse production mhrs of the OPS compartment 
per submarine class by flight 
 
 
Figure 9.  Outfitting density verse production mhrs of the OPS compartment 
trend analysis for LA class and OH Class. 
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The machinery compartment mean outfitting density was plotted against mean 
production mhrs by submarine class for the machinery compartment in Figure 10. The 
outfitting densities for Los Angeles, Virginia and Ohio class submarines are very similar, 
thus it was expected that the production mhrs were very close, within 25 percent of one 
another. Within each of the submarine classes, there was a slight production mhrs 
increase as the outfitting density increases. These trends are shown in Figure 11. There 
was not enough end data reported for Virginia class to witness any correlation within the 
class. On Los Angeles class, for every unit increase in outfitting density in the machinery 
compartment, approximately 371,201 additional mhrs will be needed with a linear 
reliability of 0.66. For the Ohio class, for every unit increase in outfitting density in the 
machinery compartment, 605,179 additional mhrs will be needed with a linear reliability 
of 1.0. There are only two data points for the Ohio class, so the linear reliability value is 
1.0. 
 
Figure 10.  Outfitting density of the machinery space per submarine class by 
flight versus mean production mhrs per submarine class by flight 
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Figure 11.  Outfitting density for the machinery space vs production mhrs for 
LA Class and OH Class. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Through the analysis, no obvious correlation can be drawn throughout the 
submarine fleet relating outfitting density to production mhrs. The resultant slope of the 
increasing trend within Los Angeles and Ohio classes for both the OPS compartment 
(Figure 9) and machinery compartments (Figure 11) show that there is a positive 
correlation between outfitting density and production mhrs. As the compartment becomes 
more dense (higher outfitting density), the needed production mhrs increases at 
approximately the rate of the slope. As more Virginia class return data is reported from 
the assembly yard to NAVSEA, the Virginia plot can be developed. If the resulting slopes 
are similar to Los Angeles, there may be a correlation that can be applied to a CER for 
future cost estimates.  
For the Ohio Replacement program, the OPS compartment outfitting density is on 
par with the Seawolf class outfitting density. The construction methods used to produce 
Ohio Replacement will be similar to the Virginia class enabling the shipyards to leverage 
their learning curves and as many similar components as possible. The projection is that 
the production mhrs for the OPS compartment will be more than the Ohio class, but less 
than the Virginia class. The machinery compartment outfitting density is denser than the 
Los Angeles improved class and less dense than the Seawolf class. The expectation based 
on this analysis would be that there would more production mhrs charged for the 
machinery compartment of the Ohio Replacement class than what was charged for Los 
Angeles class, but less than for the Seawolf class.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis investigated the relationship between outfitting density and 
construction cost through the use of production mhrs. The assumption was that as more 
components are installed into a limited volume that it would potentially take more 
production mhrs to complete. The result was a positive correlation between the outfitting 
density and production mhrs of the OPS and machinery compartments. More data is 
needed for the Virginia class to be able to validate the correlation.   
For Ohio Replacement, the expected production mhrs/LT will be within 500 
mhrs/LT of the fleet mean production mhrs/LT after learning curve. Since the 
construction method to be used for Ohio Replacement is the same as for Virginia, and 
with a philosophy to harness as much of the Virginia process and components as 
possible, the learning curve should be less than for the other classes.   
During the modular construction process, the compartment end loading in the 
production line offers space and access to areas that are not available once the units are 
loaded and the submarine is fully assembled. For sustainability, removal and 
reinstallation of interferences and the ability to access certain areas may be seen as an 
increase to the maintainer mhrs charged. It would be interesting to see how maintenance 
mhrs have been affected by outfitting density. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Future Research 
While going through the process to create the methodology and analysis for this 
small scope study, many questions arose that would be beneficial for future research. 
a. Outfitting Density Correlation for Maintenance Hours 
As mentioned in the conclusion, the rafted compartments and end loading in the 
production line offers space and access to areas that are not available once the units are 
loaded and the submarine is fully assembled. This can encourage a behavior to install 
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components tightly. Removal and reinstallation of interferences and ability to access 
certain areas in maintenance availabilities could increase maintainer mhrs charged. A 
correlation could be investigated and aid in formulating mhrs estimates for certain areas 
of the submarine for maintenance period cost estimate. 
b. Compensated Gross Tonnage 
Submarine designs are historically evolutionary designs based on the prior class 
of submarines. To add complexity to an already very densely outfitted design results in a 
disproportionate increase in construction costs. Compensated Gross Tonnage (CGT) 
represents the complexity of a vessel design and is a measure of the internal volume of a 
vessel multiplied by a compensation coefficient (First Marine International 2005). 
Merchant ships typically use CGT as a factor to define complexity and relate it to cost. 
Studies have been done for United Kingdom naval vessels by John Cragg, Damien Bloor, 
Brian Turner and Hamish Bullen and documented in their paper, “Methodology Used to 
Calculate Naval Compensated Gross Tonnage Factors.” Submarine CGTs could be 
developed to quantify design complexity and understand its potential as a cost driver.    
c. Acoustic Requirements and the Effect on Procurement Costs 
The demand for acoustic and silencing properties for naval vessels and their 
components increases with each submarine class to meet the predicted adversary threats. 
Inside the vessel, everything from pumps to mounting deck structure is affected, as well 
as quieting material properties that cover the outside of the submarine. It would be of 
interest to see if a correlation could be investigated between these historical increases in 
the acoustic requirements and their effect on cost. Survivability/shock requirements could 
be of similar interest as well. 
d. Uncertainty Evaluation of Early Phase Costing Estimates 
In the early acquisition phases of concept refinement and technology 
development/preliminary design, a weight estimate and a costing position are developed 
for the submarine being designed. Both are built with large assumptions. To understand 
the uncertainty and potentially draw a quantifiable evaluation that can be used by the 
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costing community, it would be of interested to compare the return P-5 end cost data back 
to the costing positions of the two milestone costing positions.   
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APPENDIX 
The data used for this thesis can be obtained from the following resources: 
 
Weight data from the Final Weight Reports: 
Naval Surface Warfare Center – Carderock Division 
Department 844 
9500 MacArthur Blvd.  
West Bethesda, MD 20817-5700 
 
End-Cost and Production Man-hour Data: 
Naval Sea Systems Command  
NAVSEA 05C   
1333 Isaac Hull Avenue, SE 
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